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Abstract
Wireless devices are everywhere, at home, at the office, and
on the street. Devices are bombarding us with transmissions
across a wide range of RF frequencies. Many of these invisi-
ble transmissions reflect off our bodies, carrying off informa-
tion about our location, movement, and other physiological
properties. While a boon to professionals with carefully cal-
ibrated instruments, they may also be revealing private data
about us to potential attackers nearby.
In this paper, we examine the problem of adversarial WiFi
sensing, and consider whether ambient WiFi signals around
us pose real risks to our personal privacy. We identify a pas-
sive adversarial sensing attack, where bad actors using a sin-
gle smartphone can silently localize and track individuals in
their home or office from outside walls, by just listening to
ambient WiFi signals. We experimentally validate this at-
tack in 11 real-world locations, and show user tracking with
high accuracy. Finally, we propose and evaluate defenses in-
cluding geo-fencing, rate limiting, and signal obfuscation by
WiFi access points.
1 Introduction
Advances in wireless technology over the last decade have
made wireless devices ubiquitous in our homes, offices, and
outdoor settings, covering nearly all areas where urban pop-
ulations reside today. These devices inundate our surround-
ings with invisible RF signals of many frequencies, from
mid-frequency signals like cellular and WiFi, to very high
frequencies in the millimeterwave range. While some sig-
nals pass harmlessly through our bodies, others bounce off
of our bodies, giving professionals with specialized equip-
ment information about our emotional states, heart rates, or
even postures [42, 47, 87, 70, 71, 40].
But are we unknowingly revealing too much about our-
selves and our actions? While we live and move in areas
densely covered by wireless signals, we remain largely obliv-
ious to the amount of information our bodies divulge on a
continuous basis. Could we be continuously leaking infor-
mation about our locations and movements, even when we
are not carrying any (trackable) devices?
Traditional Human Sensing
(a) Active Mode (b) Passive Mode (c) Our Attack
Figure 1: Traditional human sensing designs either (a) relies
on active transmissions by attacker devices, or (b) deploys
many sniffer devices. (c) Our attack uses just a single sniffer
device (with a single antenna).
In this work, we consider these questions under the um-
brella of adversarial WiFi sensing, where adversaries lever-
age reflections from ubiquitous WiFi signals to enable po-
tentially malicious applications. Specifically, we consider
the malicious task of human sensing through walls, where
the attacker seeks to localize and track users in their home or
office from outside walls, even when the victims do not carry
any WiFi devices. Take for example the scenario of thieves
looking to break into an office building, either to steal doc-
uments or to gain physical access to sensitive data. Being
able to identify and track the location of any employees or
security personnel gives them a huge advantage in avoiding
detection. Similarly, bad actors could track the location and
movements of the occupants of a house, as a precursor to
burglary or other crimes. In both cases, the attack must func-
tion for all human targets, regardless of whether they carry
any WiFi devices.
There are a number of technical tools that would enable
such an attack in practice (summarized in §9). One straight-
forward “active sensing” approach is to deploy one of the
several existing RF-based human sensing systems (e.g. [30,
77, 80]). These techniques require the attacker to actively
transmit RF signals and measure the reflections of the tar-
get(s) (see Figure 1a)1. Active RF emissions make it easy to
1We notice that several existing works [81, 27, 53] have used the term
“passive sensing” to refer to device-free sensing scenario, i.e. where the
target users do not carry any RF devices, but the sensing device is actively
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detect and locate the attacker. A stealthy alternative would
be to use passive WiFi radar (e.g.[18]), where multiple syn-
chronized WiFi receivers (equipped with directional anten-
nas) coordinate to listen to ambient WiFi signals and ex-
tract their doppler shifts to locate human users. This attack
can also be done by replacing the group of WiFi radar de-
vices with laptops (each with three antennas) densely placed
around the target area [13] (Figure 1b). Finally, some local-
ization techniques rely on fingerprinting their targets ahead
of time [51, 70, 12, 20], which clearly does not apply here.
Yet none of these systems can help us answer the key ques-
tion of interest: how much information are we already leak-
ing from ambient WiFi reflections, and how easy is it for an
attacker to learn about our location and behaviors? User
location and tracking using active transmissions is a well un-
derstood problem. We also know that given enough passive
listeners, they can cooperate to detect movement in a target
area. But what about a single, passive attacker device with-
out carefully tuned specialized equipment or help from lots
of cooperating devices? What can it learn about us by just
passively monitoring the ambient RF signals and reflections
around us?
We believe that passive user localization and tracking by
a single attacker is already possible using today’s commod-
ity smartphones. Our approach to adversarial user sensing
leverages two recent developments in WiFi networks:
• Our homes and offices are filled with ambient WiFi trans-
missions from near-ubiquitous deployment of WiFi IoT
devices like security cameras, home assistants, media cen-
ters and access points (APs).
• Recent work [3, 57] shows that smartphones with Broad-
com WiFi chipsets2 can accurately capture detailed prop-
agation behavior of any ambient WiFi signals, in the form
of the amplitude of channel state information (A-CSI). A-
CSI provides a microscopic view of the signal fluctuation
caused by human movements, enabling their detection. In
the past, CSI could only be captured by a device who
actively communicates with a carefully configured target
transmitter [1, 74].
Turning Ambient WiFi Signals into Tripwires. Lever-
aging these two factors, we develop a passive human sensing
attack by placing a single commodity smartphone (as a snif-
fer) outside of the victim’s house/office, which just listens to
ambientWiFi traffic (Figure 1c). The key driver of our attack
is a novel A-CSI model that converts ambient WiFi signals
into invisible tripwires radiating aroundWiFi devices, which
silently monitor users in their own home/office. When a user
makes a move (e.g. sitting down, waving her hands, open-
ing/closing a door, walking) near a WiFi device x, our sniffer
transmitting signals. We consider these to be “active sensing,” since the
sensing device must transmit signals to generate reflection signals.
2Broadcom’s WiFi chipsets are the most common WiFi chipsets used on
mobile devices [4].
immediately detects the movement and localizes the victim
by observing x’s A-CSI values. This calculation requires in-
formation about the locations of WiFi devices in the victim’s
home/office, which our system first estimates from the same
ambient signal captured by the same sniffer.
In this paper, we describe our efforts to understand the
feasibility, challenges, and defenses surrounding the topic of
passive adversarial sensing. In short, our key contributions
can be summarized as follows.
• We identify the passive, adversarial human sensing attack
using a single smartphone, and design a new A-CSI based
technique for adversarial sensing.
• We build a complete prototype of an attacker system, and
demonstrate that the attack is not only highly accurate (de-
tecting and localizing users to an individual room with
99% accuracy), but also highly general (effective in 11 dif-
ferent physical settings, including both office buildings and
residential apartments).
• We propose and evaluate three potential defenses, geo-
fencingWiFi signals, rate limitingWiFi signals, and signal
obfuscation. Our results show that only signal obfuscation
by WiFi APs is both practical and effective.
Our work shows that using just a single smartphone as a pas-
sive sniffer, an external attacker can already silently local-
ize and track our movements inside our own home/office.
While not able to identify fine-grained features like move-
ment speed and type (which require active sensing and/or
fingerprinting), our attack does raise an alarming concern on
the “vulnerability” of us reflecting ambient RF signals.
Broader Implications. Recent research efforts have ag-
gressively pursued the use of RF sensing as a way to measure
and understand ourselves and our environment. Yet few have
considered the adversarial aspects of these RF sensing tech-
nologies, and what risks they pose to unsuspecting targets.
We believe passive human sensing using commodity smart-
phones is just one of many practical attacks made possible
by inventive uses of RF signals. We hope our work brings
more attention from the security community to an under-
studied topic with potentially numerous technical and social
challenges.
2 Attack Model
We begin with a definition of our attack model. Our goal
is to study a single practical and concrete instance of ad-
versarial sensing attacks. We make basic assumptions about
the attacker’s resources and capabilities, in order to deter-
mine what a minimally equipped attacker can accomplish.
As shown in Figure 1(c), our attacker places a sniffer outside
a target building (residential or office), passively sniffs am-
bient WiFi transmissions, and uses captured signals to locate
and track human movements within the building. We make
no assumptions about human targets being tracked.
We make the following assumptions about the adversary.
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• We assume the adversary does not have physical or remote
access to WiFi devices in the target building, thus these
WiFi devices are secure. We assume the attacker can phys-
ically move outside the target area, either outside exterior
walls or along public corridors.
• To avoid detection, the attacker only performs passive
WiFi sniffing, and avoids bulky or specialized hardware,
e.g. directional antenna, antenna array, and USRP [7]. In-
stead, they prefer commodiy smartphones with a single
built-in antenna (one for 2.4GHz).
• The adversary has access to rough floorplans of the target
building. These are generally publicly available thanks to
real estate websites and apps, e.g., Zillow and Redfin.
We intentionally choose a resource-limited attacker to un-
derstand the ease with which adversarial sensing attacks can
take place. Less resource requirements imply that the attack
can be successful in a wider range of adversarial scenarios.
3 Attack Methodology
Before diving into details of our attack, we first present the
intuition behind it and an overview of the attack process.
3.1 What We Get from Ambient WiFi Signals
Our attack leverages the ubiquity of ambient WiFi emissions
today to locate and track users. Whether it is routers, lap-
tops, media sticks, or new IoT devices like voice assistants,
cameras, and smart appliances, WiFi devices reside in every
room at our homes and work. They also constantly flood
their surroundings with wireless signals3. WiFi sniffers out-
side the room or building can passively listen to these signals
without risking detection. Since WiFi packets do not encrypt
source and destination MAC addresses, the sniffer can iso-
late packets of each transmitting device even under MAC
randomization [56, 61, 43] (details in §8). In our attack we
refer to these WiFi transmitters as anchors.
For each anchor, an attack sniffer can extract two metrics
from its “ambient” WiFi signals (even if they are encrypted):
• Amplitude of CSI (A-CSI) measures the signal strength on
each of the many frequency subcarriers of a transmission.
Because human movements change the dynamics of multi-
path signal propagation between the anchor and the snif-
fer, A-CSI values observed at the sniffer will also fluctu-
ate over time. This fine-grained feature provides a micro-
scopic view of human movements.
• Received Signal Strength (RSS) is the signal strength mea-
sured from a transmission, but aggregated over all the fre-
quency subcarriers. Such aggregation makes it relatively
insensitive to user movements.
It is important to note that from ambient signals, a passive
sniffer with a single antenna is unable to extract advanced
3We list a summary of common WiFi devices seen at homes and offices
and their traffic patterns later in Table 1.
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Figure 2: The attack sniffer monitors anchor X’s signal by its
A-CSI STD. When a target moves near X, a subset of signal
paths from X to the sniffer are affected, leading to larger
STD. When the target is away from X, it has less impact on
the signal propagation from X to the sniffer, so A-CSI STD is
less. When no one is present, A-CSI STD is even smaller.
features like phase of CSI and Angle of Arrival (AoA)4 that
many existing sensing designs rely on. Estimation of CSI
phase requires the sniffer to actively synchronize with the
transmitter, while AoA estimation requires the sniffer to have
two or more antennas [75]. These physical limitations rule
out the feasibility of using most techniques introduced by
prior sensing work (e.g. [80, 30, 11]).
3.2 Turning Ambient Signals into Tripwires
In an office/home setting, human users are never completely
stationary. Whether it is playing games, walking, opening
doors, sitting down, or standing up, their natural movements
will disturb the signal propagation of nearby WiFi transmit-
ters (anchors), creating variations in their A-CSI values seen
at the sniffer. Figure 2 illustrates this trend using two sam-
ple traces of A-CSI standard deviation (STD) averaged over
multiple sub-carriers, of an anchor x, when a human user is
in proximity to x and when there is no human presence.
Furthermore, the degree of disturbance depends heavily
on the user’s distance to the anchor. When the user is away
from x, her activities will produce much less disturbance to
the signal propagation from x to the sniffer. Figure 2 shows
another sample trace of x’s A-CSI STD when the user is in a
different room, and the values are much smaller.
Together, these observations show that a hidden adver-
sarial sniffer can detect human movements near any anchor
by just monitoring its signals, and locate human movements
over time from the temporal sequence of the “triggered” an-
chors. That is, by capturing A-CSI STD of ambientWiFi sig-
nals sent by different anchors, the attacker effectively turns
4AoA measures an incoming signal’s propagation direction.
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these signals to a dense net of invisible tripwires radiating
around each anchor, and uses them to locate targets.
Our proposed use of A-CSI for detetcting and localizing
targets differs from existing works on A-CSI based activity
detection [46, 70]. The latter matches observed A-CSI pat-
terns to pre-trained ones (i.e. fingerprints defined a priori) to
recognize specific gestures (also infeasible under our attack
scenario), but cannot localize the human target.
3.3 Locating Anchor Devices
To set up these “tripwires,” the attacker needs to know the
location of each anchor device. Again, this is achieved using
the same, single, passive smartphone with a single antenna.
We take an existing passive device localization design,
which estimates the anchor location from RSS observed at
various locations. Specifically, the adversary simply holds
the sniffer and performs a brief measurement by walking out-
side the target building, either along a public corridor inside
an office building or outside a house. A short walk with the
sniffer will capture RSS of all the (observable) anchor de-
vices. It then fits the RSS measurement into a model to es-
timate the anchor location. Resourceful attackers could even
use robots or drones to carry out the measurements.
The key contribution of our work is not in the localization
algorithm, but a statistical algorithm to identify proper RSS
data samples as input to the localization algorthm. This is be-
cause in practice, the adversary has little control on the avail-
able walking path and the propagation environment, thus the
spatial RSS measurements will contain bias, noise and even
human errors. To boost localization accuracy, we develop a
consistency-based data sifting algorithm that selects proper
RSS samples for localization.
3.4 Overview of the Attack Process
With the above in mind, we now present the high-level
overview of the attack (shown in Figure 3).
• Bootstrapping: The attacker takes a brief walk around the
target building, and sniffs ambientWiFi signals to discover
and locate WiFi anchor devices inside the building.
• Continuous sensing: The attacker hides the same sniffer
at a static location outside the target area. The sniffer con-
tinuously monitors ambient WiFi signals, and uses them
to locate and track human presence and movements inside.
The sniffer also monitors each detected anchor, and any
relocation of an anchor will trigger its removal from the
anchor list, and possibly another bootstrapping phase to
(re)locate the anchors.
Next, we describe our design of the continuous sensing phase
in §4 and the bootstrapping phase in §5.
4 Continuous Human Sensing
During continuous sensing, the attacker sniffer seeks to de-
tect, locate and track human presence by converting ambi-
Anchor
Locations
Attack
Sniffer
(Brief Walk)
Static Attack Sniffer
Bootstrapping Continuous Sensing1 2
Figure 3: Our attack process includes a bootstrapping phase
and a continuous sensing phase.
ent WiFi transmissions into a dense net of tripwires radiat-
ing around many anchors in the target area. As discussed in
§3.2, the key insight is that human movements near an an-
chor x increase the A-CSI variance of x’s signals seen at the
sniffer. The key novelty of our work is to recognize and ana-
lyze such variation across multiple anchors, and use them to
detect, locate human presence to their individual rooms and
track their movements over time.
Next we describe our attack design assuming that the at-
tacker has exercised the bootstrapping phase to locate anchor
devices, and has a rough floorplan of the target area.
4.1 Detecting Human Movements
Natural user movements will disturb propagation of ambi-
ent WiFi signals. Such disturbance can be observed by the
attacker sniffer despite being outside of the building. The
disturbance is highly visible in terms of A-CSI but not RSS.
This is because movements lead to (extra) multi-path fading
and cause signal variations in each narrowband sub-carrier
of the sniffed signal [69, 70]. RSS is the received signal
strength aggregated over all the sub-carriers and the aggre-
gation hides the variations of each sub-carrier.
As examples, Figure 4 plots several 30-second samples of
an anchor x’s A-CSI STD (averaged across the sub-carriers),
for scenarios of no human presence, a user sitting down,
opening/closing the door, andwalking. Compared to the case
without any human presence, user movements lead to much
higher A-CSI variations.
For our attack, we developed a smartphone app that ex-
tracts A-CSI from passively sniffed WiFi signals (details in
§6). For signals sniffed from each anchor, we calculate the
A-CSI STD per sub-carrier using a 5-second moving win-
dow, and then average over all the qualified5 sub-carriers. In
the rest of the paper, we refer to this value as A-CSI STD.
Threshold for Human Movements. The attacker sniffer
monitors, for each anchor, its present value of A-CSI STD
to detect human presence. When it goes beyond a threshold
θpresence, the attacker declares the presence of human users.
5We exclude from our calculation the sub-carriers whose amplitude val-
ues remain very high and the standard deviation is less than 0.1. We think
this is likely because these sub-carriers operate at very high transmit power,
and thus are insensitive to user movement due to saturation.
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Figure 4: Sample traces of average A-CSI STD for scenarios of no human presence, a user sitting down in a chair, open-
ing/closing the door, and walking.
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Figure 5: An anchor’s A-CSI STD depends on
its distance to the target in the same room, and
becomes much smaller when the target is in a
different room or is completely absent.
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Figure 6: A-CSI STD of anchors in
the livingroom, bathroom and kitchen,
when the user is in the livingroom (sit-
ting, walking, playing video games).
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Figure 7: A-CSI STD of anchors in
a room and the hallway, where the
user walks out to the hallway briefly
and walks back to the room.
Choosing θpresence is similar to finding a threshold for “out-
liers.” Since human movement is relatively sparse in time
and space, anchors are mostly “idle.” Using this intuition,
the attacker first records A-CSI STDs of multiple anchors
for a period of time (e.g., hours). It then applies a widely
used statistical “outlier” measure MAD6 [24, 55] to derive
θpresence. In our experiments θpresence = 0.27 applies to the
sniffers across all test scenes.
4.2 Localizing Targets
After detecting any human presence from A-CSI STD, the
attacker also needs to localize the target, e.g. identifying the
room she is in. For this we leverage another observation on
A-CSI STD. As shown by Figure 2, our hypothesis is that the
degree of A-CSI variation would correlate with the distance
between the target and the anchor. The closer the target is
to an anchor, the more impact she would produce on signals
propagated from the anchor to the sniffer.
A-CSI STD vs. Anchor-Target Distance. We build a ray
tracing model to explore the correlation between A-CSI ob-
served at the sniffer and the distance between the target and
the anchor. The detailed model is in the Appendix. The key
intuition is that signals sent by an anchor x will take multiple
paths to reach the sniffer; a target is “bigger” when she is
closer to x, affecting more signal paths from x to the sniffer.
Thus the moving target would create larger temporal varia-
6 We assume the “idle” measurements follow a Gaussian distribution
and set MAD scale factor to 1.4826. Then at 99.5% confidence, θpresence =
3∗MAD−median(data).
tions in x’s A-CSI values, leading to a higher A-CSI STD.
We validate our hypothesis empirically using real-world
A-CSI measurements of different anchor devices and differ-
ent test scenes (more details in §7). Figure 5 plots the quan-
tile distribution of the A-CSI STD as a function of the dis-
tance between the target and the anchor, when they are in
the same room. These results indicate a general tendency of
A-CSI STD degrading with the anchor-target distance. Fur-
thermore, we also show the results when no target is present
and when the anchor is not in the same room as the target.
The STD distribution of the anchors who are close to the tar-
get (< 3m) is well separated from those of the anchors that
are not in the same room with the target.
These observations indicate a general trend that if the
number of anchors in a room is sufficiently large (e.g. 4 an-
chors in a room of common size 25m2), any user movement
in the room should be “picked up” by at least one anchor in
the room who displays large STD values (or peaks). These
peaks will be larger than the STD values of the anchors in
other rooms. While it is hard to configure a threshold for
the peaks (which could be environment specific), we instead
identify the right anchor by comparing the STD values of all
the anchors in different rooms.
Comparing A-CSI STD across Rooms. Consider the fol-
lowing examples. Figure 6 shows the traces of A-CSI STD
for three anchors, located in the living room, bathroom, and
kitchen of an apartment, where the target stays in the living
room. In this case, the anchor in the living room always has
the largest A-CSI STD, thus locating the target to the living
room. Another example is Figure 7 with two anchors, one
5
in the room and one in the hallway. The target in a room
walks towards the hallway, enters the hallway at t=80s, and
walks back into the room around t=100s. In this case, the
two rooms are connected so the user movement in the room
also triggers the anchor in the hallway. Yet the anchor with
higher STD is always in the user’s current room. Further-
more, at t=80s, we see the transition of peaks from the room
anchor to the hallway anchor, indicating that they are results
of movements from the same user.
Assigning Targets to Rooms. With the above in mind,
we design the following rules for assigning targets to rooms.
Our design assumes that the anchor density in each room
is sufficiently high, which the attacker can recognize after
running bootstrapping to localize anchors to their rooms.
Case 1: Target in only one room. We start from the
simple case where at any given time, at most one room in the
target area is occupied, e.g., a single security guard patrolling
a company at night, or a user in her apartment. In this case,
the attacker first uses θpresence to identify the set of anchors
triggered. Of all the anchors triggered, it picks the one with
the largest A-CSI STD and declares that the user is in the
room of this anchor.
Formally, let θx(t) be the A-CSI STD of anchor x seen by
the sniffer at time t. Our basic rule of room assignment is
Roomhuman(t) = Roomanchor(argmaxx,θx(t)>θpresenseθx(t)).
Case 2: Targets in multiple rooms. We consider more
general cases where multiple rooms are occupied. The at-
tacker first calculates for each room i and time t, the room-
level A-CSI STD as θ i(t) =maxx∈room i θx(t). It then applies
two rules on the room-leve STD traces to determine whether
multiple rooms are occupied by different users (rather than a
single user moving from one room to another), and to iden-
tify the occupied rooms.
• Temporal Rules: In general, users in different rooms act
asynchronously, producing peak values in each θ i(t) in dif-
ferent time segments. At a given time, we will likely see a
single peak across all the rooms. Across time, there are no
immediate transitions between peaks of different rooms,
since they are not triggered by the same user.
• Spatial Rules: A single user cannot be in two separate
rooms at the same time. At time t, if the attacker does
observe multiple STD peaks at different rooms, and these
rooms are well separated, e.g. with another room in be-
tween, then these peaks are caused by different users rather
than a single user traveling from one room to another. Sim-
ilarly, if the floor plan indicates that a user can only travel
from room A to room C via room B, and room B’s anchors
are not triggered upon detecting subsequent peaks in room
A and C’s anchors, then room A and C are occupied by
different users.
For cases where the above rules do not apply, we conserva-
tively treat the rooms with large peaks as occupied.
Tracking Targets. Our continuous sensing generates a
set of sequential events in terms of (movement time, occu-
pied room), which can be used to generate user trajectories
(details omitted for brievity). Since the attacker cannot rec-
ognize each specific user, the tracking design works well if
the number of users in the target area is small.
4.3 Discussion
Can External Pedestrian Interfere with the Sniffer?
Pedestrians who move outside of the target building near the
attack sniffer could also create A-CSI variations, leading to
false detection of user presence in the target home/office. In-
terestingly, such event can be detected because movements
near the sniffer will create sudden, simultaneous A-CSI vari-
ations and reduced RSS values at all the anchors (or at least
the majority of them). When detecting such pattern, the at-
tacker can mark the corresponding sniffer data as uncertain.
How to Place the Sniffer? The sniffer should be placed
where it can capture A-CSI signals from the detected an-
chors. When the target area has multiple rooms, the sniffer
should be placed at locations where direct propagation paths
from anchor devices to the sniffer do not align with each
other. This helps reduce the chances that user movements in
one room trigger anchors in a different room. This is feasi-
ble in practice because the attacker has the rough floor plan
of the target area.
Limitations. The attacker is unable to recognize a specific
user or an activity, e.g., distinguishing between walking and
waving hands. Doing so requires extensive knowledge on the
activities and A-CSI patterns for each user and anchor pair,
which is infeasible under our attack scenario.
5 Bootstrapping: Locating Anchor Devices
During the bootstrapping phase, the attacker uses the same
passive sniffer to identify and localize static anchors inside
the victim’s home/office. There are many device localization
proposals, from those using active communications with the
target device [9, 82], those using multiple APs equippedwith
multiple antennas [75], to those fingerprinting each possible
device location as a priori [12]. But as the attacker stays
passive and only has a single smartphone with a single built-
in antenna, RSS-based passive device localization [37, 40]
becomes the most feasible candidate. Specifically, with a
brief walk outside of the victim’s home/office, the adversary
measures RSS of ambient WiFi signals at multiple locations
along the trajectory. These spatial RSS values, together with
the trajectory, are fed into a RSS-based propagation model
to estimate the locations of the anchors.
Finding High-Quality RSS Measurements. When de-
ploying this approach to our attacker system, we found that
the localization accuracy depends heavily on the “quality” of
the RSS measurements. Ideally, these measurements should
contain little noise, align with a propagation model, and
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cover a wide range of values to minimize fitting bias. Yet in
reality, they contain bias, noises and even human errors, lead-
ing to inaccurate localization outcomes. Instead of searching
for a new/improved localization design, we focus on design-
ing a statistical data sifting algorithm to identify proper RSS
data samples as input to the localization algorithm.
In the following, we present the RSS-based passive device
localization in §5.1, our proposed statistical data sifting in
§5.2, as well as two enhancements in §5.3 where the attack
sniffer identifies static anchors and their floor levels.
5.1 Passive Device Localization
Why RSS but not A-CSI? The localization uses RSS
measurements of ambient signals rather than other advanced
metrics like A-CSI, CSI or Angle of Arrival (AoA) [63, 31].
This is due to two reasons. First, accurate CSI-based local-
ization relies on multiple antennas and the phase component
of CSI to derive AoA [39]. Our attacker sniffer only has
one antenna, and cannot estimate phase of CSI accurately
due to lack of synchronization with the transmitter. Recent
work [31] estimates AoA from A-CSI but only if the snif-
fer and targets are in complete line-of-sight, i.e., no walls.
Second, as shown in §4, A-CSI is sensitive to nearby tar-
get movements. As the adversary has no knowledge of the
target status during bootstrapping, it cannot rely on A-CSI
for localization. In comparison, RSS is robust against target
movements and a more reliable metric for localization.
Localization via RSS Model Fitting. RSS model fit-
ting [37, 40] is widely used for passive transmitter local-
ization. Leveraging the correlation between RSS and sig-
nal propagation distance, it fits the captured RSS values
into a propagation model to estimate the transmitter loca-
tion. For our attack design, we use the log distance path
loss model [59]. The detailed calculation is listed in the Ap-
pendix. We also experimented with other passive RF local-
ization methods, including (weighted) centroid [17], gradi-
ent [25], and ecolocation [79]. They perform worse and re-
quire many more spatial RSS measurements.
RSS model fitting requires the walking trajectory, which
can be recorded using IMU sensors (e.g., the built-in ac-
celerometer and orientation sensor on smartphones). For our
attack, we built a smartphone app to record the trajectory and
the RSS values simultaneously. The tracking error is less
than 1m per trace and has minimum impact on localization.
5.2 Consistency-based Data Sifting
A straightforward solution is to filter out “bad” measure-
ments using de-noisingmethods, ranging from the traditional
Kalman filter [19], wavelet filter [65] to the newly proposed
feature clustering algorithm that remove bad measurement
rounds [40]. We found that these methods are insufficient
under our attack scenarios because the propagation environ-
ment is highly complex and unknown to the adversary, mak-
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Figure 8: Localization results from our Monte Carlo sam-
pling. Each red dot is the estimated anchor location from a
sample; the rectangle marks the room of the anchor.
ing it hard to distinguish between noise and natural propaga-
tion effect. Features used by [40] to identify bad measure-
ment rounds are too coarse-grained to effectively control lo-
calization accuracy. Our experiments in §7 show that more
than half of the good measurement rounds identified by [40]
will locate the device to a wrong room.
Instead, we propose consistency-based data sifting to
identify proper data samples that will be used for model fit-
ting. Our hypothesis is that, by the law of large numbers [58],
consistent fitting results frommany random sampling of RSS
measurements, if exist, can reveal true signal propagation be-
haviors and produce high-fidelity localization results.
Based on this hypothesis, we introduce two rounds of data
sifting, one within each measurement round and one across
different rounds. A measurement round represents RSS mea-
surements collected during a single walk on the corridor.
Data Sifting via Monte Carlo Sampling. Given a
round of RSS measurements R, we apply the Monte Carlo
method [2] to randomly sample a subset (80%) ofR as the in-
put to the model fitting. This is repeated by N = 1000 times,
producing N localization results. Using standard cluster-
ing algorithms like K-means, we find natural clusters among
these N results. If they form many small clusters with dif-
ferent room placements, then R is inconsistent and cannot
be used for localization. If a dominant cluster exists and its
averaged fitting mean square error (MSE) is less than those
of the other clusters, then R can be used for localization.
Figure 8 plots an example result of the Monte Carlo sam-
pling on a single round of RSS measurements. The sampling
process produced a single, dominant cluster, while the rest
of the result data points are widely scattered.
In this case, we consider the dominant cluster, compute
the room location of each data point, and use them to com-
pute the statistical distribution of the device’s room location,
i.e. the probability of the device being in each room. In the
current design, we simply choose the room with the highest
probability as the location of the device. A more advanced
design could leverage statistical patterns of the clusters to
refine localization decision. We leave this to future work.
Consistency Check across Measurement Rounds.
When multiple rounds of sniffing measurements are avail-
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able, the adversary can also perform consistency check
across them. If the localization result (room-level estimate)
is consistent across multiple rounds of measurements, then
the result is confident. Overall, we found that consistency
check across 4 rounds of measurements is sufficient to
achieve a room placement accuracy of 92.6% on average
(across the 11 test environments).
5.3 Attack Enhancement
We also develop two enhancements that use RSS measure-
ments to check the mobility status (static vs. mobile) of an
anchor and its floor level. Our attack only uses static anchors.
Detecting Stationary Anchors. RSS of a stationary trans-
mitter, when captured by a stationary sniffer, should stay rel-
atively stable. When a static device relocates to a different
location, its RSS seen by the sniffer will also change.
Before making spatial RSS measurements in bootstrap-
ping, the adversary first places the sniffer statically to record
RSS of ambient signals and identify static devices. Later in
the continuous sensing phase, the static sniffer also monitors
each anchor from its RSS. Upon detecting significant RSS
variations for an anchor, the attacker either removes it from
the anchor list or run bootstrapping to relocate anchors.
Floor Level Signal Isolation. For buildings with multi-
ple floors, our attack needs to know the floor level of each
anchor. Our floor level detection leverages the physical ge-
ometry of signal propagation: RF signals emitted by devices
on different floor levels arrive at the sniffer in different (verti-
cal) directions. If the sniffer can identify the incoming angle
of the WiFi signal, i.e., angle of arrival (AoA), we can in-
fer the floor level. However, our commodity sniffer cannot
measure AoA because it only has a single antenna.
We show that coarse (vertical) AoA estimation can be
achieved by adding a simple, and compact smartphone case
to our sniffer, emulating a directional antenna. For our at-
tack, we place a simple cone object of size 8cm× 6cm×7cm
on top of the smartphone (sniffer) and wrap it with aluminum
foils. Now the smartphone sniffer can only capture WiFi sig-
nals through the cone. The adversary, standing or sitting in
a car, rotates the sniffer while it records the RSS of ambi-
ent signals and the phone angle (via the built-in gyroscope).
The estimated AoA of a transmitter is the direction that max-
imizes its RSS. The adversary then infers the floor level by
comparing the estimated AoA value to the projected AoA
values for different floor levels (derived from the floor plan).
We validate our design by the adversary staying on the first
floor and measuring the AoA of the WiFi devices on the first
and the second floor of a building (ground truth AoA of 0◦
and 25◦, respectively). The measuredAoAs for these devices
are 5◦ and 32◦, respectively, which are widely separated.
This indicates that the devices are on different floors, prov-
ing the effectiveness of the floor detection. Finally, while our
AoA approximation is sufficient for floor level detection, it
is too coarse-grained for anchor localization.
6 Attack Implementation
We prototype our attacker system using a commodity smart-
phone as the sniffer. We implement the bootstrapping and
continuous sensing modules as two Android apps. Specifi-
cally, we use two popular and inexpensive Android phones,
Nexus 5 and Nexus 6. They are equipped with the Broad-
comWiFi chipset with a single antenna and a WiFi firmware
from Nexmon [57] to perform passive sniffing. For spatial
RSS measurements (during bootstrapping), we use the built-
in IMU sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) to detect and
count user stride, and construct the walking trajectory. The
RSS measurement is at a much faster rate, and we average
the RSS values measured during a single stride.
Passive Sniffing of A-CSI. Previously, CSI can only be
captured when the WiFi receiver is actively communicating
with the transmitter [23]. Our attack leverages a recent de-
velopment ofWiFi firmware [57] to capture A-CSI while op-
erating in the passive sniffing mode.
Our implementation addresses two artifacts in A-CSI mea-
surements caused by the firmware. First, the firmware re-
ports each A-CSI as a projected value between 0 and 40dB,
where the projection factor is unknown. Thus we configure
the movement detection threshold accounting for normaliza-
tion. Second, the firmware can only report A-CSI values at a
limited speed, up to 8–11 packets per second. Thus our app
subsamples sniffed packets based on this rate limit. Despite
these limitations, our prototype sniffer is able to capture suf-
ficient A-CSI samples to successfully launch the attack.
Computation and Energy Cost. One strength of our at-
tack is its simplicity. For our current smartphone prototype,
the bootstrapping app runs 1000 rounds of Monte Carlo sam-
pling and model fitting, which finishes in less than 25s per
anchor. Our continuous sensing app takes less than 1s to
compute average A-CSI standard deviation. These two apps
consume 4.18 watts (bootstrapping) and 2.1 watts (continu-
ous sensing), respectively. Using Nexus 5 (2300mAh bat-
tery) this enables 4.1 hours of continuous sensing. Currently
our apps are not optimized for energy, which we leave to fu-
ture work.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate our proposed attack using experiments in typical
office buildings and apartments. We first describe our exper-
iment setup and scenarios, and then present our evaluation
on individual attack phases (bootstrapping and continuous
sensing), followed by an end-to-end attack evaluation.
7.1 Experiment Setup
We performed attack experiments at 11 typical offices and
apartments that are accessible to us. The owners of each
test scene volunteered for our experiments. These test scenes
are of different sizes and configurations, and have different
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Device Type Exact Product Packet Per Second (pps), Idle Packet Per Second, Active
Static
Cameras (without Motion Detection) AHD Security Camera N/A 124
Cameras (with Motion Detection) Amcrest/Xiaomi IP Camera ≥0.5 108
Home Voice Assistance Amazon Echo, Google Home 2 16
Smart TV (& Sticks) Chromecast, Apple TV, Roku 6.64 200
Smart Switches LifeSmart Plug ≥2.44 ≥3.33
WiFi Router Xiaomi/Cisco/Asus Routers 28.6 257
Mobile
Surveillance Robot iPATROL Riley Robot Camera N/A 124∗
Smartphones Samsung/Google/Apple Phones ≥0.5 ≥6
Table 1: Summary of anchor devices used by our experiments. ∗Emulated by mounting a camera on a robotic car.
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duration estimation.
wall materials except for concrete7. For each test scene, the
building has multiple floor levels, but all the rooms of the
test scene are on the same level. The walking path available
to the adversary also differs across experiments, from indoor
corridors to outdoor pathways. We listed the configuration
of our test scenes in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Inside each test scene, we either reused existing WiFi de-
vices or deployed our own WiFi devices to generate ambi-
ent WiFi signals. These are popular commodity products
for smart offices and homes, e.g., wireless security cameras,
voice assistants, WiFi routers, and smart switches. In total,
we have experimented with 31 WiFi devices, including 6 se-
curity cameras and 6 laptops. Table 1 summarizes these de-
vices and their traffic patterns during idle and active periods.
Even when idle, these devices periodically transmit packets.
The packet rate varies from 0.5 packet per second (pps) to
more than 100 pps. These devices were naturally placed at
locations where they are designed to be: security cameras at
room corners, smart switches on the wall outlets, laptops on
desks, and WiFi routers in the center of the room for cover-
age. We focus on the 2.4GHzWiFi band due to its dominant
coverage. We also tested 5GHz WiFi and did not observe
notable difference except its shorter coverage.
For the bootstrapping phase, the adversary holds the snif-
fer while walking outside the target scene (indoor corridor
or outdoor pathway). For each test scene, we collected 50
walking measurements, each of 25–50 meters in length and
0.5–2 minutes in time. We also changed the target’s WiFi
device placements and repeated the experiments. In total,
we collected more than 3000 RSS measurement traces, with
more than 121,000 location-RSS tuples.
7Our attack does not work when the wall separating the targets and the
adversary is made of concrete, which blocks WiFi signals completely.
For the continuous sensing phase, we hid the static sniffer
behind plants or at the corners (on the ground) outside of the
target building within 1m to the building wall. We asked vol-
unteers to carry out normal activities in each test scene (one
moving person per room at any given time), and collected
more than 12 hours of CSI entries. The volunteers were
aware of the goals and results of the attack but not the spe-
cific techniques. We also experimented with different types
of target activities and movements.
7.2 Accuracy of Continuous Human Sensing
To test the performance of our continuous sensing phase, we
assume that the attacker knows the exact room where each
anchor device resides. Our evaluation focuses on answering
the following questions on attack effectiveness.
Q1: Can the attacker detect & localize targets?
Our results were based on all the CSI recordings across our
test scenes. For each room with at least 1 anchor device, we
studied the decision made by the attacker in terms of whether
a human user is present in the room or not, and compared this
result to the actual human presence. Here we divided time
into 5s slots, and for each slot we calcualted the average A-
CSI STD for each anchor device, and used them to identify
the room occupancy in the target area. We then calculated
the precision and recall values across all the time slots and
rooms. Recall measures the detection rate upon a target’s ac-
tual presence in a room, and precision measures the fraction
of the actual presence in a room among all detections. To
an attacker, a high recall is relative more important since a
low recall value means the attacker will miss some human
presences in a room.
Figure 9 plots the recall and precision values for rooms
with different number of anchor devices. As expected, the
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recall value depends on the number of anchor devices per
room, 87.8%, 98.5% and 99.8% with 1, 2, and 3 anchor de-
vices in the room, respectively, while the precision remains
>99% for all the cases. With only one anchor in a room, the
recall is lower, because the user could be further away from
the anchor, and her movement introduces less observable im-
pact on the anchor’s A-CSI, leading to possible misses. With
more anchor devices in the room, the detection coverage in-
creases quickly.
Q2: Can the attacker track a moving human target?
We first consider cases where a user travels back and forth
between two connecting rooms in the building (room 1 and
2) and each room has two anchor devices. Specifically, a
user walks in one direction about 25 seconds, turns around
to walk in another direction and repeats. Figure 10 shows
the detected user occupancy of the two rooms, where our
detection is highly responsive to (rapid) human movements.
We also consider all the A-CSI traces and look at the dura-
tion of individualmovement events estimated by the attacker.
We compare these estimations to the ground truth. Figure 11
plots the CDF of the duration estimation error, where for
80% of the cases, the error is less than 16 seconds.
Q3: If an anchor device transmits infrequently, does it
“help” the attack?
So far, our results assume that the anchor devices send pack-
ets at no less than 11pps8. But in reality, certain WiFi de-
vices are often in the idle state, e.g. home voice assistants,
and transmit packets infrequently. To study the impact of
anchor packet rates, we take the CSI traces of WiFi secu-
rity cameras (w/o motion detection) and sub-sample them
to produce desired packet rates. Our experiments show that
when an anchor operates at its full rate (an equivalent CSI
rate of 11pps), the recall is 88.5%, which reduces to 58.4%
at 2pps, and 31% at 0.5pps. The precision remains >99%.
This means that each low-rate anchor still helps the attacker
identify and locate targets. When a room consists of multi-
ple low-rate anchors, the attacker should take the union of
the detection results produced by these anchors to improve
the attack recall value.
7.3 Evaluation of Bootstrapping
For bootstrapping (where the attacker locates anchors), we
consider two performance metrics: absolute localization er-
ror which is the physical distance between the ground-truth
location and the attacker-estimated location, and room place-
ment accuracywhich is 1 if the attacker always find the exact
room the anchor is at, and 0 if the attacker always places the
anchor to a wrong room. Figure 12 plots, for each test scene,
the quantile distribution of the absolute localization error and
the room placement accuracy.
Q4: Does data sifting improve anchor localization?
8 As discussed in §6, the firmware reports CSI in an equivalent packet
rate of 8-11pps.
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Figure 12: Bootstrapping performance: anchor localization
accuracy in terms of absoluate localization error (m) and
room placement accuracy, for each of the 11 test scenes.
We compare the localization performance of RSS model fit-
ting with and without our proposed data sifting, and when
applying feature clustering based data filtering [40]. We
make two key observations. First, blindly feeding RSS mea-
surements into model fitting leads to a considerable amount
of localization errors and room placement errors. In 5 out of
the 11 test scenes, this baseline solution places more than
40% of anchor devices in the wrong room. Second, our
data sifting significantly boosts the localization accuracy and
room placement accuracy. For more than 90% of the cases,
an anchor is placed at the right room.
Using fine-grained data sampling rather than coarse
features, our sifting design also outperforms the feature
clustering-based filtering [40]. In scene 8, 9, and 10, our de-
sign produces similar (and even larger) absolute localization
error but higher room placement accuracy. This is because
our design directly accounts for the room placement consis-
tency, rather than raw localization errors. Smaller absolute
localization error does not always translate into higher room
placement accuracy.
Q5: What kinds of anchors are hard to localize?
It is difficult to localize anchors placed at room boundaries,
e.g. those directly plugged into wall outlets. These boundary
anchors do create a dominant Monte Carlo cluster, but the
data points in the cluster map to either of the two neighbor-
ing rooms. Currently, we make a simple binary decision by
choosing the room with the higher probability, which might
not be accurate. As future work, we plan to improve our
design by marking these devices as “boundary” anchors and
treat them with caution during the continuous sensing phase.
Q6: Are idle anchors hard to localize?
The localization performance is insensitive to the device type
and transmission rate. All the 31 devices we have tested al-
ways transmit packets at 0.5pps and above. The RSS mea-
surements are relatively time insensitive and thus can be ag-
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gregated over time. As long as the measurements cover over
20m in distance (space) and sample the RSS values evenly
between -75dB and -30dB, we observed no notable differ-
ence in localization (and room placement) accuracy.
7.4 End-to-End Attack Evaluation
Finally, we evaluate the end-to-end performance of our at-
tack, combining both bootstrapping and continuous sensing
phases. Since the goal of our attack is to recognize and track
human user’s presence and movement, we again use recall
and precision as the key performance metrics. An effective
attack should have both high recall and high precision val-
ues, indicating a high rate of detection and low rate of false
alarms. Lower values in these two metrics can be the result
of misplaced anchors during bootstrapping, or errors in lo-
calizing users during continuous sensing.
Table 2 lists the precision and recall values for detecting
and localizing human users to their individual rooms (per
room). We also vary the number of WiFi devices per room
to examine its impact on the success rate of the attack.
# of WiFi Devices Per Room
1 2 3 4
Per Room
Recall 81.67% 96.65% 99.39% 99.89%
Precision 91.84% 87.37% 83.10% 79.35%
Per Area
Recall 87.84% 98.53% 99.82% 99.98%
Precision 99.93% 99.88% 99.82% 99.77%
Table 2: End-to-end performance of our attack
With more than 2 WiFi devices in a regular room, our at-
tack can detect more than 99% of user presence and move-
ment in each room tested. The tradeoff is slightly lower pre-
cision values, because the probability of assigning a WiFi
anchor to the wrong room also increases. On the other hand,
if one can “relax” the requirement of detecting user activity
in each individual room to detecting in the target area (per
area result in the table), then our attack can achieve very high
recall and precision (>99.77%). Here, a potential improve-
ment to our attack is to perform movement detection using a
carefully chosen subset of anchors with more confident room
assignments. We leave this optimization as future work.
8 Defenses
Having demonstrated the effectiveness of our passive sens-
ing attacks, we now explore robust defenses against them.
Our key insight for developing defenses is that the effective-
ness of the attack depends heavily on both the quantity and
quality of the WiFi signals captured by the sniffer. Thus a
defense reducing the amount of WiFi signal leakage to ex-
ternal sniffers or adding inconsistency to WiFi signals could
render the attack ineffective.
The Failure of MAC Randomization. The first solu-
tion to come to mind would be MAC address randomiza-
tion, a well-known method for protecting mobile devices
against tracking. Since the attack sniffer uses MAC address
to isolate signals of each anchor device, MAC randomiza-
tion can disrupt both bootstrapping and continuous sensing
phases. However, recent work has shown that MAC random-
ization is disabled on most devices (<3% of adoption rate so
far) [44] and can be easily broken to reveal the real MAC ad-
dress [43, 5]. Thus Android 9.0 Pie switches to per-network
MAC randomization [6], which does not apply any MAC
randomization to static WiFi devices. Thus MAC random-
ization is not a plausible defense against our attack.
Next, we explore three alternative defenses for reducing
the quantity and/or quality of sniffed WiFi signals. We ex-
perimentally evaluate their effectiveness against the attack
and discuss the strengths and limitations of each.
8.1 Geofencing WiFi Signals
Geofencing creates a geographical boundary for WiFi signal
propagation to significantly reduce or eliminate WiFi signals
accessible to the adversary, in terms of the size of the area
where the adversarial sniffer can hear signals, and the total
number of packets captured. For example, while our exper-
iments in §7 were based on walking traces of 25–50 meters
each, geofencing might reduce the area with a signal in our
walking trace to 10 meters or less. If we reduce our sniffed
packet trace accordingly, the localization error increases sig-
nificantly. Raw errors more than doubled, and room-level
accuracy dropped from 92.6% to 41.15%.
Practical Implications. Geofencing, deployed effec-
tively, can be very effective against adversarial sensing at-
tacks. But in practice, geofencing is extremely difficult to
deploy and configure. The simplest form is reducing the
transmit power of the WiFi devices, which is almost always
undesirable, since it degrades connectivity of WiFi clients.
Another alternative is to equip WiFi devices with directional
antennas, thus limiting RF emissions in the spatial domain.
This approach is undesirable because it not only requires
users to upgrade to equipment with higher cost and larger
form factors, but also carefully configure their antenna di-
rectionality. Finally, the extreme solution is to block RF sig-
nals from propagating beyond walls by painting (boundary)
walls with electromagnetic shielding paint. This is impracti-
cal, since it would also block cellular signals.
A more practical alternative is to customize WiFi signal
coverage using 3D fabricated reflectors, proposed recently
by [76]. It has limited applicability and considerable com-
plexity, since the reflector configuration depends on both
WiFi device placement and details of the environment.
8.2 WiFi Rate Limiting
While geofencing reduces spatial leakage of WiFi signals,
rate limiting reduces their temporal volume. When anchors
transmit less signals over time, the sniffer will not have suf-
ficient data to compute A-CSI and STD. Results in §7 show
that reducing anchor packet rates lowers the recall value.
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Practical Implications. Rate limiting is simple to im-
plement, but creates undesirable artifacts to network appli-
cations. As shown in Table 1, many WiFi devices in offices
and homes, even when idle, transmit beyond 2 packets per
second (pps). This makes rate limiting impractical.
8.3 Signal Obfuscation
Our third defense is to add noise to WiFi signals, so the
adversary cannot accurately localize anchors or detect user
movements. We refer to this to as signal obfuscation.
Signal obfuscation can take place in both temporal and
spatial forms. In temporal obfuscation, WiFi devices change
their transmit power (randomly) over time, injecting artificial
noises to signals seen by the sniffer. But recent work [40]
shows that the adversary can counter this defense by deploy-
ing an extra static sniffer to infer the injected signal power
changes and remove them from the signal traces. In spatial
obfuscation, two WiFi devices transmit via a single MAC
address. Since signals come from two physically separated
transmitters, a sniffer cannot accurately predict of their lo-
cations. Yet this requires tight synchronization and active
coordination between devices, without which it is possible
for the sniffer to separate data streams.
AP-based Signal Obfuscation. We propose a practical
defense where the WiFi access point (AP) actively injects
cover traffic for any of its associated WiFi device w that is
actively transmitting. As soon as the AP detects a trans-
mission from w, it estimates w’s transmission rate Tw and
injects a cover traffic stream with the same Tw, at a random-
ized power level and with w’s MAC address. If AP limits
its cover traffic stream to match w’s throughput, then WiFi’s
CSMA protocol will randomly interleave packets from the
two streams together. In the worst case (Tw is at or higher
than available channel throughput), the cover traffic will re-
duce w’s effective throughput by half (50%). If Tw is less
than half of available throughput, then the additional cover
traffic will have minimal impact on w’s throughput.
With this defense, the attacker’s RSS measurements of an-
chor w will display fluctuations, tricking the adversary to
think that w is moving and making it useless as an anchor.
Even if the adversary assumes w is stationary, the noisy RSS
measurements will lead to inaccurate anchor placement. It is
possible for Monte Carlo sampling (§5) to extract “clean”
measurements of w, but the probability is extremely low.
More importantly, A-CSI of these anchors will contain suffi-
cient variations, indicating that a user is always present.
The insertion of “fake” packets requires a careful design,
so that it disrupts the attack rather than creating obvious
“anomalies” or heavily affecting the WiFi network. The AP
configures the sequence numbers of fake packets to (par-
tially) interleaved with those of real packets, so that the at-
tacker is unable to separate the two streams based on se-
quence number and packet arrival time. The AP also needs
to continue to periodically adjust its transmit power.
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Figure 13: Performance of bootstrapping (top) and continu-
ous sensing (bottom) with and without signal obfuscation.
When evaluating this defense, we assume that the adver-
sary deploys countermeasures by adding an extra station-
ary sniffer, and applies signal subtraction [40] to remove
“injected” signal variations. Figure 13 (top) compares the
anchor localization accuracy with 3 schemes: using AP-
obfuscation, using only device power randomization, and no
defense. For anchors not in the same room as the AP, even
with attacker countermeasures, AP-obfuscation reduces an-
chor localization accuracy from 90% down to 38%. Device-
based power randomization is rendered ineffective by the
countermeasure. If the AP and w are in the same room, the
attacker can still localize the transmissions to the room.
Figure 13 plots the impact on continuous sensing when
no user is present. The AP-based defense injects signal
variations and confuses the attacker, making it constantly
sense the presence of a user, effectively protecting the lo-
cation/room from our attack.
Practical Implications. This defense can be deployed
by today’s WiFi APs that support transmit power adaptation
with minor changes. The major drawback is the extra con-
sumption of bandwidth and energy at the AP. We note that
this defense targets attackers with a single antenna device.
Advanced attackers with multiple antennas (> 3) could po-
tentially separate AP signals from device signals by estimat-
ing their angle of arrival, making the defense less effective.
9 Related Work
Location Privacy. Whether it is compromising service
providers [52], hacking into social networks [26] or smart-
phone sensors and power meters [48, 45], existing works
have identified a wide variety of attacks on location privacy
and subsequent defenses [14, 73, 60, 52, 49, 29, 15]. Our
work targets a different type of location privacy attack, which
tracks presence and movement of targets by monitoring am-
bient WiFi transmissions.
Privacy Invasion from Traffic Analysis. User presence
and activity can change traffic patterns of someWiFi devices,
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e.g., cameras with motion detection transmit more packets
when an active object is present [16]. Prior works use traffic
patterns of sniffed signals to infer user status [36, 56, 84], but
require accurate identification of each device, knowledge of
their transmission behaviors, and can be easily countered by
adapting device transmission behaviors. Our attack does not
make any of these strong assumptions.
Privacy Invasion from Signal Sniffing. Similar to our
attack, existing works develop attacks to locate devices and
infer user activities (based on the located room type) using
WiFi and ZigBee signals [40, 13] or acoustic signals [47].
Our attack differs from them as follows. [40] focuses solely
on locating WiFi cameras using RSS, and applies feature
clustering to identify good measurements. Our work devel-
ops a different and more effective sifting method to identify
good signal measurements, and targets a different problem
of locating users who do not carry any WiFi devices.
With a strong assumption that a known router is placed
in the center of a home, [13] deploys multiple laptops (each
with three antennas) outside to detect human movements us-
ing either CSI or RSS measurements. With their design, each
laptop can only detect user movements that block the direct
path between the laptop and the router. Thus [13] deploys
many laptops around the house to detect user movements but
still cannot locate them. Our work takes a different method-
ology: we use a single smartphone (with a single antenna)
to monitor ambient transmissions from many devices in the
home; our A-CSI STD model also provides accurate room-
level localization of user movements.
[47] detects user presence using specially crafted acoustic
signals transmitted by devices in their own homes. It requires
remote access to these devices, a strong assumption in prac-
tice. Our attack leverages ambient WiFi signals and does not
require any access to devices in the target area.
Device-Free Human Sensing. Non-adversarial human
sensing correlates human movements with wireless signal
variations caused by these movements, thus not requiring hu-
man to carry any devices. Sensing can be achieved by either
active probing or passive snooping.
Existing works in the active category deploy a transmit-
ter to continuously send probing signals (either standard RF
signals or crafted RADAR signals like FMCW [11, 86]),
and deploy receiver(s) to capture signals as they bounce
off the targets. Existing designs operate on either time of
flight (ToF) [30, 53], frequency shift [11, 86]), CSI phase
shifts [69, 67, 80] or RSS [81, 62]. Our attack differs from
these works by being passive, not requiring any RF transmis-
sion by the attacker device. Also our sensing design operates
on A-CSI rather than CSI phase, ToF or RSS.
Works in the passive category sniff existing wireless sig-
nals to detect human presence and activities. The majority of
existing proposals rely on fingerprinting, i.e. mapping any
observed signals to a pre-defined fingerprint representing a
specific target location and/or activity. A fingerprint can be
based on A-CSI [46, 70], CSI phase [51], RSS [27, 64], or
raw signals [72]. Yet fingerprinting requires target cooper-
ation, clearly infeasible under our attack scenario. Another
work extracts doppler shift from sniffed signals to detect hu-
man presence but cannot locate the target [18]. It also re-
quires a large antenna dish.
Others use non-WiFi/RF signals, e.g. RFIDs [85], visible
light [83, 38], acoustic [41], to sense human activities. They
require control of transmitters inside or outside of the target’s
home/office, and are infeasible under our attack scenario.
Transmitter Localization. Solutions to this well studied
problem can be divided into three categories: fingerprinting,
active probing, and passive trilateration. Fingerprinting first
uses measurements of RSS, CSI or other metrics within the
target area to build a database of signal patterns (fingerprints)
for each location. It then maps any observed signal pattern to
the closest fingerprint to determine the device location [64,
12, 20]. This is clearly infeasible under our attack scenario.
Active probing exchanges RF or acoustic communications
with the target device to measure signal propagation delay,
degradation or phase shift in order to compute the distance
to the target [8, 50, 82, 9], followed by trilateration.
Finally, passive localization often leverages receivers with
multiple antennas [10, 63, 31, 75, 35] to estimate signal in-
coming angle (AoA), and applies triangulation across multi-
ple receivers to derive the target location. Recent work [34]
lowers the antenna count to 3, but requires at least two line-
of-sight paths between the transmitter and receiver (i.e. no
walls) and multiple APs. Our work (bootstrapping) differs
by using a single smartphone with a single antenna. We
use an existing branch of passive localization that fits spatial
measurements of RSS to a propagation model [28, 40, 22].
Our key contribution is a data sifting algorithm that identifies
good RSS samples as input to the model fitting.
Defense against RF Eavesdropping. Existing works [33,
54, 21, 68] defend against eavesdropping on a transmitter
by a jammer transmitting simultaneously, preventing the at-
tacker from decoding packets or estimating AoA. This re-
quires precise synchronization between the transmitter and
the jammer [32] or a high-end full-duplex obfuscator [54].
Our defense uses the AP to insert fake packets (rather than
transmitting simultaneously), which is simple to deploy and
effective against attackers with a single antenna.
10 Conclusion
Our work brings up an inconvenient truth about wireless
transmissions. While greatly improving our life, they also
unknowingly reveal information about our location and ac-
tions. We show that bad actors outside of a building can
secretly track user presence and movement inside the build-
ing, with just a single smartphone listening to ambient WiFi
transmissions (even if they are encrypted). To defend against
these attacks, we must limit the volume and coverage ofWiFi
signals, or ask APs to obfuscate signals using cover traffic.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Details on RSS Model Fitting
Our RSS model fitting uses the log distance path loss model,
which is shown to be robust in indoor environments [37].
This model captures the relation between the RSS Pi and the
sniffer’s distance di to a WiFi transmitting device (TX) when
the attacker sniffer is at a location index i:
Pi = (PTX −PREF)− 10γ log10 (di/dREF)+ noise
= PTXo − 10γ log10 di+ noise
(1)
where γ is the path loss component, PTX is the trans-
mit power of the target device TX , PREF is its reference
power received at distance dREF , and PTXo = PTX −PREF +
10γ log10 dREF . When the attacker detects that the sniffer and
the target device TX are on the same floor level (see §5.3),
we can approximate di by
di ≈
√
(xi− xTX)2+(yi− yTX)2
where xs and ys are 2D coordinates. If TX is detected to be
on a different floor,
di ≈
√
(xi− xTX)2+(yi− yTX )2+(z− zTX)2
where z and zTX are vertical heights of the sniffer and the
target TX . The attacker will pre-calculate z− zTX using our
floor level detection (§5.3).
The goal of RSS modeling fitting is to estimate (xTX ,yTX )
as well as (γ,PTXo), using spatial measurement of RSS val-
ues {Pi}. The corresponding model fitting is formulated into
a least square optimization problem:
minimize
xˆTX ,yˆTX ,PˆTXo ,γˆ
∑
i
(Pi− Pˆi)
2,
subject to (xˆTX , yˆTX) ∈ Candidate area,
PˆTXo ≤ 30dB,
γˆ ∈ [2,6]
(2)
The constraint on γˆ follows the well-known observations
from empirical measurements [66] while the value of PˆTXo
is upper bounded by the maximum transmit power for WiF
frequency defined by the FCC.
We also experimented with other types of propagation
models. Among them, only a complicated ray-tracing model
accounting the floor plan of the target building [76] achieves
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a marginal gain over the above log distance model. Given its
high complexity and computation cost, we did not include it
in the final attack. Resourceful attackers can further improve
the localization by switching to more sophisticated models.
11.2 Details on Distance Impact on A-CSI
In §4.2, we make a hypothesis about A-CSI STD and the
target-anchor distance. When a human user moves around a
transmitter (TX), she blocks and diffracts some signal prop-
agation paths from TX to a receiver (RX). When the user is
close to TX, the set of paths affected by her movements is
larger than that when she is far away from TX. As such the
received signals seen by RX will display a larger variation
σ2 as the user gets closer to TX.
To confirm this hypothesis, we build a ray tracing model
on signal propagation from TX to RX as follows. Let Pk
represent the received signal power at RX on sub-carrier k,
measured at wavelength λk. Pk can be modeled as an aggre-
gation of multiple (N) signal paths S= {pi}i=1..N [78]:
Pk =
∥∥∥∥∥
N
∑
i=1
pi(di,Γi,λk)
∥∥∥∥∥ (3)
where di and Γi are the propagation distance and reflec-
tion/diffraction coefficient of the signal path i = 1..N, resp-
sectively.
For simplicity, we also assume that the human user moves
at a constant speed around TX with a fixed distance r. Simi-
lar to a widely used model [28], we consider complete block-
age (i.e. the coefficient Γi= 0 or 1) and disregard the contri-
bution of signal phase in the above summation.
When the user moves near the TX (at distance r1), some
signal paths S(r1) are blocked. We denote the time upon
blockage as [t1, t2] during time [t0, t3], where t0 < t1 < t2 < t3.
Then the received signal power in time is:
Pk(t,r1) =
{
∑i/∈S(r1) pi(di,Γi,λk) if t ∈ [t1, t2]
∑i pi(di,Γi,λk) otherwise
(4)
From above, we know the mean power µk(r1) over [t1, t2]
must follow µk(r1) > Pk(t,r1). Similarly, µk(r2) > Pk(t,r2)
when t ∈ [t1, t2]. At distance r2 > r1, the set of blocked
signal paths |S(r2)| < |S(r1)|, thus Pk(t,r2) > Pk(t,r1) > 0
t ∈ [t1, t2]. Therefore,
µk(r2)> µk(r1) (5)
The standard deviation σk(r) between t0 and t3 is defined as:
σ2k (r) =
1
t3− t0
∫ t3
t0
(Pk(t,r)− µk(r))
2dt (6)
From these conditions, we can easily show that σ2k (r2) <
σ2k (r1). And the averaged standard deviation over k sub-
carriers follow the same observation.
11.3 Details on Test Scenes
The following table lists the configuration of our test scenes,
which include both offices and apartments of different sizes.
Sniffer Test # of Mean Room # of # of Building
Path Scene Rooms Size (m2) Devices Floors
Indoor
Hallway
1 6 14.19 7 10
2 7 14.60 5 10
3 8 13.65 3 37
4 3 14.50 13 15
5 3 9.51 5 13
6 6 14.21 15 3
7 5 16.75 8 3
8 4 44.39 8 9
9 2 69.83 4 3
Outdoor
Sidewalk
10 2 47.20 4 3
11 4 12.99 6 2
Table 3: Test scene configuration.
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